Question for Spencer/Henry Shooters

[Eggman]

Mr. Emory Hackman in his website hackman-adams.com says "With the Spencer the ammunition was gone before the fight was over," and, "Regiments with rapid fire repeaters in the Civil War had to be shunted aside in the major battles." He contends that running out of ammunition was a habitual problem. He also said that the repeaters generated so much smoke that unless there was a strong breeze the enemy could move up close to the repeater shooters because they (the repeater shooters) were essentially blind.
He also said "The cratridge could be successful in the wide variance in barrel bore diameter shown below [52(.540 to.555)] because the bullet had a huge hollow in its base same style as the Minie ball first used in the .58 Springfield musket.
Question: can anyone document any of this???

[John Holland]

I have seen quite number of original Spencer bullets, both fired and unfired, and they have all had solid bases.

In my experience with original Spencer Rifles and Carbines I have found the bores to be rather consistant. But, the Sharps is altogether different. Sharps had the worst quality control of just about any of the Civil War carbines. The dimensions you have cited would fit a Sharps very well. That is why the Sharps "Christmas Tree" bullet has 3 different diameters in one bullet....to fit anything from a .52 to a .55 diameter bore. In fact, when Sharps Carbines were converted to .50-70 some of the bores were small enough that they weren't even sleeved! That is why every once in a while you can find a Sharps converted to .50-70 with a 6 groove bore. All the sleeves were 3 groove.

JDH
Sharps Collectors Ass'n., Life Member

[John Gross]

Mr. Emory Hackman in his website hackman-adams.com says "With the Spencer the ammunition was gone before the fight was over," and, "Regiments with rapid fire repeaters in the Civil War had to be shunted aside in the major battles." He contends that running out of ammunition was a habitual problem.


There was certainly a concern by some officers that ammunition would be wasted, and one can easily find reports of troops armed with repeaters running out of ammunition. But telling exactly why they ran out of ammunition is a bit harder (i.e., did they "waste" it or were they just heavily engaged). One can just as well find incidents of troops armed with more conventional firearms running low or out of ammunition, so such a problem was not unique to repeaters (for example at Gettysburg the 20th Maine on Little Round Top armed with muzzle loaders and Berdans men along the Emmitsburg Road with Sharps are two examples that come to mind).

The concern of waste was such that beginning with the Model 1865 Spencer and continuing to WWII with the 1903 Springfield, the military required a magazine cut-off. I also believe that the M16 is no longer selective for semi or full auto, but only for semi and 3-shot burst.

While I would not agree with Mr. Hackman that wasting ammunition was a "habitual problem", I will say that it was, and continues to be, a concern.

http://www.clicksmilies.com/auswahl/waffen093.gif

John Gross

[R. McAuley 3014V]

There was certainly a concern by some officers that ammunition would be wasted, and one can easily find reports of troops armed with repeaters running out of ammunition. But telling exactly why they ran out of ammunition is a bit harder (i.e., did they "waste" it or were they just heavily engaged). One can just as well find incidents of troops armed with more conventional firearms running low or out of ammunition, so such a problem was not unique to repeaters (for example at Gettysburg the 20th Maine on Little Round Top armed with muzzle loaders and Berdans men along the Emmitsburg Road with Sharps are two examples that come to mind).

The concern of waste was such that beginning with the Model 1865 Spencer and continuing to WWII with the 1903 Springfield, the military required a magazine cut-off. I also believe that the M16 is no longer selective for semi or full auto, but only for semi and 3-shot burst.

While I would not agree with Mr. Hackman that wasting ammunition was a "habitual problem", I will say that it was, and continues to be, a concern.

These comments remind me of a friend of mine, the late Colonel Lewis Lee Millett, Sr. (1920-2009). “Lew”, also a member of the Society of Vietnamese Rangers, received the Medal of Honor in the Korean War (1951) for leading the last major American bayonet charge since Cold Harbor. His award of the MOH was only related to a second bayonet charge which anyone can read about on-line in his interviews and biography.

http://www.historynet.com/military-hist ... illett.htm (http://www.historynet.com/military-history-interview-with-colonel-lewis-l-millett.htm)

In the first bayonet charge, three days before, Lew was the new company commander of Easy Company, 27th Infantry “Wolfhounds,” and had heard Chinese propagandists claiming how Americans were too afraid of using the bayonet. Only Lew and two others were lone survivors of the unit in that first engagement when they defended a hilltop during an overnight attack by two Chinese divisions. After having exhausted their ammunition, hand grenades (and what rocks they threw to simulate grenades and trick their attackers), the survivors finally resorted to hand-to-hand combat with cold steel. Following the engagement, their relief went forward of the unit’s defensive position and found of some 180 enemy killed, 19 were slain by bayonet alone.

Three days later, Lew was wounded by a Chinese hand grenade while leading another bayonet charge up Hill 180! Four men of Easy Company were killed, while 47 Chinese and North Korean defenders were wiped out. It was for this second action, and other circumstances that he was awarded the Medal of Honor.

After the Korean War, Lew volunteered for Ranger School, and later served in Vietnam with the 101st Airborne, organizing the Vietnamese Rangers with ARVN officers who had completed the stateside U.S. Army Ranger School. During his subsequent sojourn as an advisor to the II Corps Phoenix Program, Lew was joined by his three sons, the eldest (Lewis Lee, Jr) was only about 12 years old when his father took him out on his first combat patrol. His dad just wanted his sons to learn about war first-hand, then they could decide whether they wanted to follow in their dad’s footsteps and make it a career. As far as I know, both Lee and his brother John served in the military; Lew Jr. as a civilian advisor to the Honduran government during the CIA-led support of the Contras in Costa Rica; and John was killed in 1985 while returning from peacekeeping duties in the Sinai Peninsula. I’m not sure what Timothy did. In 1983, Lee and I bought up blood-soaked Soviet stable belts as "Afghan War" souvenirs not realizing they’d be dirt cheap a few years later.

Prior to retiring, Colonel Millett served with the U.S. Army Security Agency (ASA) at Fort Devens where in 1982 I attended airborne school compliments of 10th Special Forces Group, some six months after I had first met Colonel Millett at a reunion of the Society of Vietnamese Rangers. Like many friends who are now gone, while their memories live on, their comradeship is sorely missed. But as a former Infantryman (11C Heavy Weapons Leader), I'm not afraid of using the bayonet when I run out of ammo! I just have to fight against my instincts to use my entrenching tool!!!

[Eggman]

My difficulty with Mr. Hackman's statements is not so much that repeater outfits ran out of ammo but in that they were different in this regard from other breechloader equiped units. Like for example at Brice's Crossroads we had Grierson's first cavalry brigade initially engaging Forrest on the left -- the Yankee units including the 2nd New Jersey with its Spencers. According the the brigade commander, when finally relieved by the infantry the whole brigade was out of ammo, not just the New Jersey guys. As a footnote, the New Jersey men only suffered serious loss when part of regiment became lost on the retreat to Memphis.
That's my problem; finding situations (documentation) where the repeater guys were unique.

[John Gross]

That's my problem; finding situations (documentation) where the repeater guys were unique.


If Mr. Hackman is to have credibility, it is his responsibility to provide documentation for his assertions. I have been reading and studying about Civil War firearms for 40+ years, and while I sure haven't read everything nor claim to know everything, I will say again that I do not agree with Mr. H. that troops armed with repeaters had a "habitual problem" of running out of ammunition.

Sure, you can find some instances of careless use of repeaters, such as the opening paragraphs of the Repeaters chapter in Joe Bilby's book CIVIL WAR FIREARMS. However, the following facts cannot be denied.

a) The Federal Government purchased approximately 100,000 Spencers, and continued to use them into the Indian Wars.

b) The State of Massachusetts, as well as private purchases, accounted for additional sales of Spencers.

c) The Federal Government purchased 1,700 Henry rifles.

d) Private purchases accounted for approximately another 10,000 Henry rifles.

e) While you can find some negative statements about the Henry and Spencer by soldiers and officers, by and large these arms were well regarded and much sought after during the war.

f) A Union general, I THINK it was Sheridan, said that the effectiveness of the Spencer shortened the war by one year. While such a statement it hard to prove, it does show the high regard held for the repeating firearm.

John Gross

[Southron Sr.]

"Logistics, logistics, logistics-while amatures speak of strategy and tactics, true military professionals speak in terms of logistics." Old military college saying.

Today, because we are a "mechanized society" we tend to forget that during the Civil War army supplies were delivered to either a railhead OR landing/wharf and from there were transported in mule or horse drawn wagons. So providing an army on campaign with adequate amounts of supplies (including ammo) was a much bigger problem than it is today.

That being said, the military establishment in 1861 was populated with an officer corps that was, for the most part, arch-conservatives. So when the new breechloaders came along, the arch-conservatives condemmed them on the grounds that they "wasted ammunition," or soldiers issued breechloaders would "shoot up all of their ammunition before the end of the battle" etc.

All of these were spurious arguments that have been proven wrong. It is interesting to note that some "historian" has dragged up all of these old myths and half-truths and trying to pass them off as historical fact!

[R. McAuley 3014V]

Even as late as 1863 a recognized authority on military subjects in this country, in writing of the wasteful expenditure of ammunition on the battle-field, says: “It becomes a self-evident fact that they (soldiers) fire too fast already, and that it is only adding to the evil to give them the means of firing four or five times as fast by placing breech-loading guns in their hands.”
[Source Citation: “The Development of the Military Rifle” by Lieutenant Joseph M. Califf, Third U.S. Artillery, in The Railroad and Engineering Journal (1889) Ed. by M.N. Forney, Vol. LXIII (Vol. III, New Series), p8]

Union Chief of Ordnance Brigadier General James W. Ripley (USMA Class of 1814, retired 15 Sept 1863, died 1870) was vehemently opposed to firearms utilizing “new fangled, self contained cartridges,” not simply the Spencer. Ripley believed when soldiers exhausted their self-contained specialty ammunition, any firearms incapable of taking ‘tried and true ball and powder’ would be essentially worthless. General Ripley berated the Spencer as “too expensive, too heavy, and too wasteful of ammunition.” The first 1,000 Spencer Carbines were delivered on 3 October 1863, eighteen days after Ripley retired.

[Edwin Flint, 8427]

As I recall, Lincoln personally ordered that the Army buy the Spencer after testing the gun himself. I believe the target used is part of the Museum at Camp Lincoln(NGB) in Springfield IL.

Notice the folks complaining are the RE folks not the line troops.

[DAVE FRANCE]

If the US army had had enough spencers and Henrys for half the Infantry and Cavalry, they could have decreased the supply problem by using fewer solders and putting more resources into supply. They wouldn't have needed as many horses for artillery or cavalry.

I think having enough Henrys and Spencers for half of the army would have caused more casualties and a tremendous reduction in morale for the CS soldiers.

Think how you would feel if you were part of a unit with muzzle loaders that was charging a US position with Henrys. And using Henrys must have been a big advantage in the attack, because a soldier could lie down if necessary but still keep up fire on the enemy.

David

[John Gross]

Union Chief of Ordnance Brigadier General James W. Ripley (USMA Class of 1814, retired 15 Sept 1863, died 1870) was vehemently opposed to firearms utilizing “new fangled, self contained cartridges,” not simply the Spencer. Ripley believed when soldiers exhausted their self-contained specialty ammunition, any firearms incapable of taking ‘tried and true ball and powder’ would be essentially worthless. General Ripley berated the Spencer as “too expensive, too heavy, and too wasteful of ammunition.” The first 1,000 Spencer Carbines were delivered on 3 October 1863, eighteen days after Ripley retired.


While it is true that the first Spencer carbines were delivered in October, 1863, approximately 11,000 Spencer rifles had been purchased well before that time (the first rifle deliveries being in December, 1862).

Hindsight is certainly of great benefit to us, and thus I believe Ripley has received a bad rap over these many years. When you read the following written by him in late 1861, it sure makes sense to me at that time.

John Gross

Washington, December 9, 1861.
Ordnance Officer,
Hon. SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War:

SIR: As directed from the War Department, I have examined the reports upon the Henry and Spencer guns accompanying the proposition to furnish these arms to the Government, and have also examined the arms. Both of them are magazine arms; that is to say, they have the cartridges for use carried in a magazine attached to or forming part of the arm and fed out by a spiral spring. They require a special kind of ammunition, which must be primed or have the fulminate in itself. The reports heretofore made are favorable, so far as the limited trials went, but they do not go farther than to suggest or recommend the procurement of a sufficient number to place in the hands of troops in the field for trial. Indeed, it is impossible, except when arms are defective in principle, to decide with confidence, in advance of such practical trials, of their value, or otherwise, as military weapons. I regard the weight of the arms with the loaded magazine as objectionable, and also the requirement of a special ammunition, rendering it impossible to use the arms with ordinary cartridges or with powder and ball. It remains to be shown by practical trial what will be the effect on the cartridges in the magazine of carrying them on horseback, when hey will be exposed to being crushed or marred possibly to such an extent as to interfere with their free passage into the barrel, and whether they will be safe for transportation with the fulminate in the cartridge; also, what will be the effect on the spiral spring of long use and exposure in the field. I do not discover any important advantage of these arms over several other breech-loaders~ as the rapidity of fire with these latter is sufficiently great for useful purposes without the objection to increased weight from the charges in the arm itself, while the multiplication of arms and ammunition of different kinds and patterns, and working on different principles, is decidedly objectionable, and should, in my Opinion, be stopped by the refusal to introduce any more unless upon the most full and complete evidence of their great superiority. In view of the foregoing, of the very high prices asked for these arms, and of the fact that the Government is already pledged on orders and contracts for nearly 73,000 breech-loading rifles and carbines, to the amount of $2,250,000, I do not consider it advisable to entertain either of the propositions for purchasing these arms.

Respectfully, your obedient servant, JAS. W. RIPLEY, Brigadier- General.

[John Gross]

As I recall, Lincoln personally ordered that the Army buy the Spencer after testing the gun himself.


In early August, 1863, Lincoln handled (but did not shoot) two Spencer rifles in his office. On both of them he had problems, one with the cartridges jamming and the other the magazine tube was stuck. When the Spencer company heard of this they dispatched Christopher Spencer to meet with the President at the White House. On August 18 Lincoln test fired a Spencer rifle at the spot where, approximately, the Washington Monument is. While Lincoln was pleased with the rifle there is no evidence that he was directly responsible for any subsequent orders.

John Gross

[Eggman]

Ed - I assume when you note the abbreviation "RE" you are referring to us "Really Exceptional" troops who take care of the important things a ways back while other folks flail around in the mud groping for their C-rats --- right?
I can relate to Ripley's concern about teething problems. Remember the first M-16s before the bolt assist (A1) was added. He made another good point - the repeater cartridge cases at the time were pure copper -- did not have the strength of modern brass cases. I don't have data on how suseptable the cases were to rough handling - does anyone have any anecdotes on that??

[Eggman]

The temptation is just too great not to add a couple of additional observations about Gen. RIpley's observations.
The general was concerned about the fragility of the copper (water tight) cartridges. What about the vulnerability of paper cartidges to rough handling and to moisture. How many (million) paper cartridges were thrown away when they got wet.
The general's mindset seem frozen in the War of 1812 when the bayonet was the decisive weapon. Field commanders in the Civil War quickly discovered(well not always quickly) that superiority of fire was the decisive element in battle. Well aimed shots, except in the case of snipers, was a myth. I would love to see some of Forrest's observations about the experience of facing Wilson's fourteen thousand Spencer shooters in 1865.
Even today suppression is the key word in tactics. Today's soldiers desire to create conditions where the enemy is denied the ability to shoot back. Applying the M-16 criteria, with its three shot burst limit, to the Spencer or Henry is a false comparison. An M-16 on full auto can empty a thirty-round magazine in what, two seconds??
I don't know what to say about the weight issue. I'd much rater tote my fully loaded Spencer to the line than my three band Enfield empty.

[John Gross]

The temptation is just too great not to add a couple of additional observations about Gen. RIpley's observations.
The general was concerned about the fragility of the copper (water tight) cartridges. What about the vulnerability of paper cartidges to rough handling and to moisture. How many (million) paper cartridges were thrown away when they got wet.


Read Ripley's letter again. He was not concerned about having to "throw away" damaged cartridges, but that damaged cartridges might interfere with the proper operation of the firearm. Here is the pertinent part.

"It remains to be shown by practical trial what will be the effect on the cartridges in the magazine of carrying them on horseback, when they will be exposed to being crushed or marred possibly to such an extent as to interfere with their free passage into the barrel, and whether they will be safe for transportation with the fulminate in the cartridge."

You need to loose the hindsight :wink: Think about the following and put yourself in Ripley's place. At the time Ripley wrote his letter (December 9, 1861), neither the Henry nor the Spencer were being manufactured beyond the patent and prototype models. As a matter of fact, the Spencer company was not even incorporated yet and had no factory. It would not be until mid-1862 when the first 300 Henrys were made (6 months after Ripley's letter), and the last day of 1862 when the first 500 Spencers were made and delivered (12 months after Ripley's letter). Add to this that metallic cartridge ammunition was in its infancy and you should certainly understand, or try and understand, Ripleys hesitancy.

Here is an incident with an early Spencer that you may not be aware of. It was written by Col. Hiram Berdan of Sharpshooter fame on December 26, 1861, and addressed to Col. Thomas Scott, Asst. Sec. of War.

"Colonel: While trying the Spencer gun yesterday, the butt of one of the cartridges burst - and some powder blew through the slot in the gate, into my face and eye, destroying the entire sight for the moment. The Surgeon thinks, however, that he will be able to save it.

"I am unable to go out today and write to ask if the agent or manufacturer of the Spencer gun is now in the city, and if so, if you will be kind enough to request him to call on me, that we may see if it is not possible to guard against similar accidents with the new guns. The bearer, Mr. Dougherty, will take any note or message you may desire to send."

Also, during the development of the Blakeslee "Quickloader" cartridge box for the Spencer, two objections of it was that the nose of the bullet would get deformed, but more importantly cartridges exploded from contact with the bottom of the magazine in the box.

And finally, you will note that Ripley was not entirely against repeating firearms, for he wrote in his letter "The reports heretofore made are favorable, so far as the limited trials went, but they do not go farther than to suggest or recommend the procurement of a sufficient number to place in the hands of troops in the field for trial."

John Gross

[Eggman]

VERY interesting. Wondering if there are any more reports like this from the field.