Small Arms Effective Range vs Engagement Range

[milsurpshooter]

I haven't found too much info on the amount of training the troops (north or south) were given using their firearms (i.e. marksmanship or range time). So, when considering rifled small arms, what was the preferred max range where engagement was initiated? I understand that tactical considerations (terrain, weather, unit size, etc....) would have been considered. I'm asking because, as an average shot and with practice, hitting silhouette-sized targets out to 400 yards is not unreasonable. But other than pickets or sharp shooters, did Civil War units engage that far our?
Thanks for the input,
- milsurpshooter

[Don Dixon]

In August 1857, Captain Henry Heth was assigned to a board convened to test breech loading rifles. At the conclusion of the tests, Heth was retained on detached duty to design a course in small arms marksmanship for the Army. Heth’s resulting system of target practice, which was largely based upon French military marksmanship theory and manuals, was adopted for Army use on 1 March 1858. The new manual was based on the theory that most U.S. soldiers were not experienced riflemen, and that few were even familiar with arms. The soldiers were first to be taught the nomenclature, disassembly, and reassembly of their weapons, so that they would become comfortable with their arms. Next, they completed an intensive series of aiming drills with their weapons, conducted both indoors and outdoors. As the soldiers mastered these concepts, they moved on to simulated firing using only percussion caps. This exercise involved snuffing out a lighted candle placed three feet from the muzzle of their weapon. If the soldier properly sighted the rifle and exercised proper trigger control and follow through, the muzzle blast from the percussion cap would extinguish the candle flame. One of the objectives of Heth’s marksmanship training system was to train the soldier to take up a firing position in which he could support the recoil of the piece when it was fired, and to accustom him to recoil when his rifle was fired. As the soldiers mastered these steps, they moved outdoors to practice range estimation. Due to the curved trajectory of the Minié ball, range estimation was absolutely critical. Once one moved beyond point blank range, relatively small errors in range estimation resulted in shots below or above the target. The Federal Army’s 1862 Manual of Target Practice -- essentially Heth's manual with his name removed -- stressed the absolute necessity of training soldiers in range estimation and devoted 10 pages to instructing officers on how to do it. As U.S. Army soldiers moved on to live firing, they were to fire at distances from 150 to 1,000 yards at the following targets, which were divided by horizontal and vertical black lines crossing at the center:



Distance in Yards

Height of Target in Feet

Width of Target in Inches



150 and 225

6

22



225 and 300

6

44



325, 350, and 400

6

66



450 and 500

6

88



550 and 600

6

110



700

6

132



800

6

176



900

6

220



1,000

6

264




The six-foot height of the target required that the soldier understand the importance of range estimation and be able to accurately estimate range. Regarding the widths of the targets, the expectation was that a trained soldier should be able to hit an individual enemy soldier at ranges to 300 yards, the area occupied by an artillery piece and crew at 600 yards, and the area occupied by an artillery section of two guns at 1,000 yards.

In Heth’s system, there were three classes of marksmen, based upon firing four rounds each at 150, 225, 250, 300, 325, 350, and 400 yards. The soldiers with the highest number of hits were to be drilled at distances beyond 400 yards and afforded an opportunity to advance in class. No individual marksmanship qualification badges, decorations, or pay bonuses were authorized in the system, but officers were encouraged to post their men’s scores and to encourage a spirit of competition between the men. The Army had no marksmansip qualification standard for anyone until 6 October 1862. On that date, the Army issued General Order (G.O.) 149, which stated that “No person shall be mustered into the service of the United States as a member of the Corps of Sharpshooters, unless he shall produce a certificate of some person, duly authorized by the Governor of the State in which the company is raised, that he has in five consecutive shots, at two hundred yards at rest, made a string [measure] not over twenty-five inches; or the same string off-hand at one hundred yards; the certificate to be written on the target used as the test.”

That was the theory. In actual practice, marksmanship instruction and firing on anything resembling a target range in both the Federal and Confederate armies was non-existant in training camps, and virtually non-existant when units deployed. Billy and Johnny didn't know how to shot. And, shooting hunting firearms at small game at hunting distances does not, did not, teach people how to shoot military firearms at militarily useful distances.

Regards,
Don Dixon
2881V

[milsurpshooter]

Excellent reply.
So, without sufficient firearms training, at what ranges would field commanders (Company, Regiment, etc...) begin engaging enemy formations? Battles such as Antietam and Gettysburg would have afforded the opportunity to engage at such ranges.
Thnx again,
- milsurpshooter

[Don Dixon]

Approximately 100 yards. With the rifle musket held level and the top of the front sight held even with the top of the sighting notch of the rear sight, your shot will be over the top of the enemy's head at about 125 yards with most of the Civil War rifle muskets. That is why one reads frequent accounts of troops in the woods being showered with leaves and branches during fire fights. The shots then come back down into the danger space at about 250 yards. Plus, troops -- particularly untrained ones -- have a natural tendency to shoot high.

What was necessary for the troops to be effective was that they be trained in the hold offs required by the sights on the Springfield rifle musket or Muster 1854 System Lorenz rifle. The Enfield had more effective sights if snuffy was ever trained how to use them. With the Muster 1854, the Austro-Hungarian Army wrote a very effective training manual, but the Federal and Confederate ordnance departments never bothered to translate it from German to English. So, training on the 250,000 Muster 1854s the Federals bought and the 100,000 the Confederates bought would have been through trial and error on a rifle range until they figured out the hold offs. Opps. The troops rarely, if ever, got range time. No wonder they thought the Austrian arms were inaccurate.

Regards,
Don

[Mike McDaniel]

Don's right. Paddy Griffith, in his work on the subject, came to the conclusion that average engagement ranges in 1864/5 were between 100 and 150 yards.

[Phil Spaugy, 3475V]

A good read by Colonel George Willard a ACW combat veteran who fell at Gettysburg.

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=mayantislavery;cc=mayantislavery;rgn=full%20 text;idno=32904903;didno=32904903;view=image;seq=5 ;node=32904903%3A1;page=root;size=100

[John Holland]

Too bad we don't have a "Like" button, because I really "Like" all of this great information!

[Jim_Burgess_2078V]

Keep in mind that deliberate, aimed fire tends to go out the window when the bullets come flying in your direction. Soldiers will tend to fire back as rapidly as possible. For that reason line formations delivering a large volume of fire were just as useful for troops armed with rifle-muskets as they were for troops armed with smoothbore muskets. Today the military still relies on volume fire (delivered with automatic weapons) more than on marksmanship.

Jim Burgess, 15th CVI

[Curt]

Hallo!

Much, up until the later years of the War when thing started looking more like "World War I" with trenches, breastworks, and fortified positions rather than open field "Napoleonic" tactics, was still based on the concept of "leveling" or holding one's musket, rifle-musket, or rifle parallel to the ground. And straight ahead. (Although as early as the F & I War some forward-thinkers were doing firing by the "left or right oblique.")

So, the weapons were "maximized" by having them parallel to the ground in order to have a linear formation of roughly shoulder to shoulder infantrymen deliver a "horizontal sheet of lead" into an opposing line of "conveniently" equally arrayed enemy infantry. Obviously, being the one to "volley" fire or fire by file or company first gave an advantage. As did having the discipline to stand there and reload a couple or few more times before fixing bayonet and driving the (in theory) shot up and demoralized enemy off the field.

It is more tedious to research but CW letters and accounts sometimes speak to the battlefield ranges that they opened fire. In the tradition sometimes of Breed's/Bunker's Hill "don't fire until you see the whites of their eyes."

For example, at Gettysburg on July 2, 1863, the 42nd New York and 19th Massachusetts on the Federal left waited until Wilcox's Alabama Brigade was 50 yards from them before they opened up.

Curt

[milsurpshooter]

Keep in mind that deliberate, aimed fire tends to go out the window when the bullets come flying in your direction. Soldiers will tend to fire back as rapidly as possible. For that reason line formations delivering a large volume of fire were just as useful for troops armed with rifle-muskets as they were for troops armed with smoothbore muskets. Today the military still relies on volume fire (delivered with automatic weapons) more than on marksmanship.

Jim Burgess, 15th CVI


I agree, and that was to some degree the purpose of my question. After my series of shots at a lone silhouette at 400 yards, where I had almost as many hits as misses (and most of the misses were near), I began to think about how effective a formation of such infantry would have been on a massed opponent. Even under some level of stress, as long as the properly trained/disciplined shooters had their sights set to the proper range, a massed volley on a large formation at 400 yards would have been devastating.

Thanks for all of the replies!
- milsurpshooter

[Don Dixon]

There was a group of marksmanship theorists, whom I think of as the "rifle partisans" in the U.S. and foreign armies. In addition to Heth, First Lieutenant Cadimus Wilcox was one of the rifle partisans – American and Europen -- who believed that rifled arms would utterly revolutionize warfare. They believed that with the increased range and accuracy of rifled arms in the hands of properly trained troops, the enemy would simply be unable to close with you. Wilcox wrote:

“Without entering into a detailed enumeration of the changes that the improved rifle will produce in tactics, a brief statement will be made as to its probable effect.
“Fields of battle will be more extended than formerly; there will be more difficulty in estimating the variety and number of the adversary; more difficulty in properly placing troops on the field, and directing their movements. Keeping them together, holding them well in hand so as to mutually protect and sustain each other, will, in future, require the greatest care. As fields of battle will cover more ground than formerly, new tactical means to obviate the disadvantages resulting from this will be required; that continuity of lines required by tactics will no longer be necessary.
“…Formerly the position of the enemy could be approached to within 300 yards without experiencing much loss from the fire of his infantry. Now this fire is destructive at 1000 or 1200 yards, and well directed at 600 yards, becomes irresistible. The range of the rifle permitting battles to commence at considerable distance, without great care on the part of the general, his whole lines may become exposed at once to a destructive fire; the position assigned to troops not immediately engaged will require as much attention as those that are so engaged. The distances between lines in battle are fixed by tactics, and much importance seems to be attached to this feature: this will probably give way to a different order…
“With the improved rifle, the infantry fire is fourfold more destructive than formerly; hence the necessity, in order to secure the full effect of the arm, to have a thorough system of instruction in target practice; every infantry soldier should be so instructed before he enters his battalion.
“…every company should be thoroughly instructed at target practice and the skirmish drill; but as some men will excel others in the use of the rifle, and have greater aptitude for the duties of light troops, the fourth battalion of each regiment should be formed of such soldiers…
“The improved rifle against cavalry. – Formerly cavalry could take up its position in columns of squadrons in full view of the infantry to be charged, at a distance of 400 yards, and could approach within 300 yaards without experiencing much loss…Under the existing condition of the infantry armament, cavalry will be within its sphere of action at 1200 or more yards, and as it approaches nearer the fire will become more and more destructive.
“The chances of success with cavalry are much lessened in the presence of the new arms…
“Improved rifle against artillery. – Formerly artillery began battles; it could take its position at pleasure in front of infantry and deliver its fire without incurring danger or loss from the fire in return of the infantry. Now that the range of the rifle is equal, if not superior, to that of field-pieces, the influence of light artillery in battles will be lessened…It is clear that field artillery, with its present range, cannot with any chances of success remain in action in front of infantry; its comparative efficacy is lessened, and even by extending the range by increase of calibre, or by a successful application of the principle of rifling, cannot restore it to its former comparative condition. The infantry rifle has now a range equal, or greater, than the limit of distinct vision, and greater even than the extent offered by field of battle in general, and should a range of several miles be given to artillery it would still fail to restore it to its former comparative state.
“The new rifle clearly gives to infantry, in all secondary operation of war, and in the defence of position, an element of force that it did not possess formerly.” [emphasis added] (Wilcox (Rifles and Rifle Practice), Chapter VI)

Jim Burgess wrote that "Keep in mind that deliberate, aimed fire tends to go out the window when the bullets come flying in your direction. Soldiers will tend to fire back as rapidly as possible." Control of fires is a command function, and a failure of control is a command failure. Well trained troops will fire very deliberately, because their training causes them to believe that they can and will hit what they aim at.

Had the Army of the Potomac been trained to Heth's or Wilcox's standard, Pickett's grand assault wouldn't even have reached Cemetary Ridge. Because, at every 50 yards, beginning at 1,000 yards they would have had to have passed through a beaten zone of fire. If they stopped to fire at you, that just meant that they passed more time in the beaten zones. But, the Army wasn't trained to shoot then, and it for sure isn't trained to shoot now. That requires time, effort, skilled instructors, ammunition, ranges, and most importantly command emphasis. Rock painting, grass mowing, and leaf raking, are construed to be much more critical skills.

Regards,
Don Dixon

[milsurpshooter]

The tactics of the day were truly outdated in regard to the rifled small arm. But just as sobering, had those arms been used to their full potential by either side, the outcome could have been drastically different. And quite possibly even more horrific.

Thanks for replies!
-milsurpshooter

[ms3635v]

If anyone is interested, I just bought a reprint of Heth's book, "A System of Target Practice: For the Use of Troops," from Amazon. The book was reprinted by BiblioBazaar. I think I paid $15.00 for it and it's a pretty cool little book.

[Curt]

Hallo!

In general, and with exceptions... the Ordnance Department viewed target practice (and repeating rifles) as a waste of ammunition. Many men were drilled on the 'School of the Soldier" but not in marksmanship.

After the War, fighting Plains Indians, complaints pop up about the lack of ammo being made available for it, or some officers having to pay for it themselves. So, even when NOT facing shoulder-to-shoulder lines of enemy infantry any longer, the dominant thinking for some time was that a "horizontal sheet of lead" was good enough despite or in spite of that the "art and science" of visionaries said.

Curt

[Smosin]

I agree, and that was to some degree the purpose of my question. After my series of shots at a lone silhouette at 400 yards, where I had almost as many hits as misses (and most of the misses were near), I began to think about how effective a formation of such infantry would have been on a massed opponent. Even under some level of stress, as long as the properly trained/disciplined shooters had their sights set to the proper range, a massed volley on a large formation at 400 yards would have been devastating.

Thanks for all of the replies!
- milsurpshooter

Britain and her well-trained professional army, armed at first with the Pattern 51 minié rifle and then the Pattern 53 Enfield, wreaked havoc on the Russians in the Crimea, often at very long ranges. Read any account of the battle of Balaclava--"As the Russian cavalry approached, the 93rd discharged three volleys: at 600, 350 and 150 yards" utterly destroying the Russian cavalry. Figure out the running speeds of a cavalry charge and you can see that the Highlanders fired and reloaded with speed and precision, and were ready to fire another volley "at point-blank range" when the remnants of the Russians fled.
Combine that and other disciplined long range infantry actions, with frequently successful British sniping operations at Russian artillery positions from 400-900 yards, with their P51's and then P53's, (even kill shots were documented at 1300 yards. Russian Admiral Nakhimov the overall Russian commander, was killed by a long-range sniper), gives you a small idea of what US Civil War battles could've been, if either side had the time or inclination to actually train troops to shoot effectively, and at long range.

[Don Dixon]

Although Captain Heth articulated an army wide theory of marksmanship instruction, the instruction was not centralized, and the U.S. Army still lagged far behind almost all of the armies of Europe. The French had established the Ecole de Tir [School of Musketry] at Vincennes, with branch schools at Grenoble, Saint Omer, and Toulouse. Each regiment in the French army was required to send a detachment of several officers and enlisted personnel to the school for an intensive four-month course. At the conclusion of the course, they returned to their regiments as cadre to teach their troops how to shoot their new rifle musket. To add emphasis, the school was commanded by a brigadier general. With the adoption of the Pattern 1853 rifle musket, the British established a School of Musketry at Hythe, England, -- commanded by a full colonel -- with a two and a half month course to train officer and enlisted cadre, who were then responsible for training their regiments on the new Pattern 1853 weapons and on marksmanship. The Spanish (1855), Dutch (1855), Swedes (1855), and Russians (1857), established similar schools. Every summer, Even before the adoption of Muster 1854 System Lorenz rifles, Baron von Augustin brought cadre from the k.k. Army regiments to Vienna for train-the-trainer instruction on marksmanship and arms maintenance. All of the schools placed emphasis on estimating distances, since without the ability to estimate range the rifles of the day could not be accurately fired at targets at a distance. By comparison, the U.S. Army had Heth’s manual.

But, how could we possibly be confused regarding our belief that America was the nation of riflemen.

Regards,
Don Dixon

[Cannonman1]

I agree, and that was to some degree the purpose of my question. After my series of shots at a lone silhouette at 400 yards, where I had almost as many hits as misses (and most of the misses were near), I began to think about how effective a formation of such infantry would have been on a massed opponent. Even under some level of stress, as long as the properly trained/disciplined shooters had their sights set to the proper range, a massed volley on a large formation at 400 yards would have been devastating.

Thanks for all of the replies!
- milsurpshooter

I would also think that a lot of this rested on how seasoned the regiment or brigade was.. Green or timid command and new regiments would start shooting a long time before the more seasoned troops would have I would expect..
Also, effect of hanging smoke and fog of war would make it harder to see the enemy at 400 yards, bringing the two sides closer than they may have wished to be before all hell broke loose.. and once engaged, it would have been like 2 bulldogs fighting over the same cat..

[milsurpshooter]

I would also think that a lot of this rested on how seasoned the regiment or brigade was.. or timid command and new regiments would start shooting a long time before the more seasoned troops would have I would expect..
Also, effect of hanging smoke and fog of war would make it harder to see the enemy at 400 yards, bringing the two sides closer than they may have wished to be before all hell broke loose.. and once engaged, it would have been like 2 bulldogs fighting over the same cat..

I recently did some more shooting at the 400 yard silhouette and video taped the shots in order to see the hits/misses. I was surprised to find that one could easily see the round traveling downrange and impacting. That also got me to thinking, once again, about a massed volley. The projectiles flying downrange from 150+ troops during a mass volley must have been easily visible, both on the sending and receiving end. Horrific, to say the least.
- milsurpshooter

[Mike McDaniel]

Given how critical distance estimation was, I'm a little surprised officers weren't issued rangefinders of some sort.

[Ron/The Old Reb]

The projectiles flying downrange from 150+ troops during a mass volley must have been easily visible, both on the sending and receiving end. Horrific, to say the least.
- milsurpshooter


​I don't think we realize or appreciate how brave these men were, who fought the Civil War.

[Don Dixon]

Captain Heth's system provided for the issue of a bronze stadia to the best shot in the company, as determined by the captain, and a silver stadia to the best shot in the regiment, as determined by the colonel. The stadias had measuring appertures based upon the height of infantry and cavalry, and were similar to those issued to artillery officers. Using the lanyard on the stadia, they were worn on the soldier's uniform like a European army schutzenschnur. The men issued the stadia were supposed to help their officers estimate distances. I've seen two stadia that were issued to men in the Pennsylvania Reserves early in the war by George G. Meade, and one that was supposedly carried by a soldier in one of Berdan's two regiments. One also very occasionally sees them in photographs of old sergeants in the post-Civil War army. But, they are extremely uncommon either in photographs or as artifacts, and very expensive as artifacts.

It gets back to the problem of having a system and then not using it. The Soviets wrote of the American Army that we had doctrine, but could be relieved upon never to follow it.

Regards,
Don Dixon
2881V

[Southron Sr.]

I highly recommend this book and website, it answers a lot of questions about Civil War marksmanship:

http://www.cfspress.com/sharpshooters/