There was a group of marksmanship theorists, whom I think of as the "rifle partisans" in the U.S. and foreign armies. In addition to Heth, First Lieutenant Cadimus Wilcox was one of the rifle partisans – American and Europen -- who believed that rifled arms would utterly revolutionize warfare. They believed that with the increased range and accuracy of rifled arms in the hands of properly trained troops, the enemy would simply be unable to close with you. Wilcox wrote:
“Without entering into a detailed enumeration of the changes that the improved rifle will produce in tactics, a brief statement will be made as to its probable effect.
“Fields of battle will be more extended than formerly; there will be more difficulty in estimating the variety and number of the adversary; more difficulty in properly placing troops on the field, and directing their movements. Keeping them together, holding them well in hand so as to mutually protect and sustain each other, will, in future, require the greatest care. As fields of battle will cover more ground than formerly, new tactical means to obviate the disadvantages resulting from this will be required; that continuity of lines required by tactics will no longer be necessary.
“…Formerly the position of the enemy could be approached to within 300 yards without experiencing much loss from the fire of his infantry. Now this fire is destructive at 1000 or 1200 yards, and well directed at 600 yards, becomes irresistible. The range of the rifle permitting battles to commence at considerable distance, without great care on the part of the general, his whole lines may become exposed at once to a destructive fire; the position assigned to troops not immediately engaged will require as much attention as those that are so engaged. The distances between lines in battle are fixed by tactics, and much importance seems to be attached to this feature: this will probably give way to a different order…
“With the improved rifle, the infantry fire is fourfold more destructive than formerly; hence the necessity, in order to secure the full effect of the arm, to have a thorough system of instruction in target practice; every infantry soldier should be so instructed before he enters his battalion.
“…every company should be thoroughly instructed at target practice and the skirmish drill; but as some men will excel others in the use of the rifle, and have greater aptitude for the duties of light troops, the fourth battalion of each regiment should be formed of such soldiers…
“The improved rifle against cavalry. – Formerly cavalry could take up its position in columns of squadrons in full view of the infantry to be charged, at a distance of 400 yards, and could approach within 300 yaards without experiencing much loss…Under the existing condition of the infantry armament, cavalry will be within its sphere of action at 1200 or more yards, and as it approaches nearer the fire will become more and more destructive.
“The chances of success with cavalry are much lessened in the presence of the new arms…
“Improved rifle against artillery. – Formerly artillery began battles; it could take its position at pleasure in front of infantry and deliver its fire without incurring danger or loss from the fire in return of the infantry. Now that the range of the rifle is equal, if not superior, to that of field-pieces, the influence of light artillery in battles will be lessened…It is clear that field artillery, with its present range, cannot with any chances of success remain in action in front of infantry; its comparative efficacy is lessened, and even by extending the range by increase of calibre, or by a successful application of the principle of rifling, cannot restore it to its former comparative condition. The infantry rifle has now a range equal, or greater, than the limit of distinct vision, and greater even than the extent offered by field of battle in general, and should a range of several miles be given to artillery it would still fail to restore it to its former comparative state.
“The new rifle clearly gives to infantry, in all secondary operation of war, and in the defence of position, an element of force that it did not possess formerly.” [emphasis added] (Wilcox (Rifles and Rifle Practice), Chapter VI)
Jim Burgess wrote that "Keep in mind that deliberate, aimed fire tends to go out the window when the bullets come flying in your direction. Soldiers will tend to fire back as rapidly as possible." Control of fires is a command function, and a failure of control is a command failure. Well trained troops will fire very deliberately, because their training causes them to believe that they can and will hit what they aim at.
Had the Army of the Potomac been trained to Heth's or Wilcox's standard, Pickett's grand assault wouldn't even have reached Cemetary Ridge. Because, at every 50 yards, beginning at 1,000 yards they would have had to have passed through a beaten zone of fire. If they stopped to fire at you, that just meant that they passed more time in the beaten zones. But, the Army wasn't trained to shoot then, and it for sure isn't trained to shoot now. That requires time, effort, skilled instructors, ammunition, ranges, and most importantly command emphasis. Rock painting, grass mowing, and leaf raking, are construed to be much more critical skills.
Regards,
Don Dixon
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